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***THE ROLE OF EU COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY IN THE
CONTEXT OF THE RUSSIA-UKRAINE WAR***

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Executive Summary

Over the years, the EU's Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) has evolved with challenges. At the same time, the scope of CSDP was gradually expanding, which required closer work with partners. New challenges were reflected in the EU Global Security Strategy adopted in 2016, which further highlighted the issue of the EU's strategic autonomy in the international arena.

In the wake of other fundamental documents, in 2022 the European Union developed a "Strategic Compass", which was given additional burdens by the Russia-Ukraine war. In fact, for the first time, it clearly defines the measures of the future defense and security policy of the European Union. The European Peace Facility (EPF) was established as another important, but this time, financial mechanism for the implementation of the security and defense policy, which is actively used in the context of the aid allocated to Ukraine by the European Union.

The involvement of third countries in the common foreign and security policy of the European Union is supported by the relevant mechanisms, which also underwent a considerable evolution, which was accelerated by the process of adequately re-evaluating the international relations situation on the part of the European Union.

As a result of Russia's full-scale military intervention in Ukraine in February 2022, the EU completely changed its approaches and cautious attitude in terms of assistance to the military component of Ukraine, which was caused by Russia's rude and brazen crossing of red lines in international relations that existed even before the war.

Since the beginning of the Russia-Ukraine war, the financial aid allocated by the European Union to Ukraine for military purposes amounted to 3.1 billion euros, in addition to bilateral aid. Along with this, the Military Assistance Mission for Ukraine (EUMAM) was launched, within the framework of which up to 15,000 soldiers of the Armed Forces of Ukraine will be trained mainly in Poland, as well as in Germany. Overall, it is the first time, the EU directly provides military aid to a third country.

Introduction

The EU Defense and Security Policy (CSDP) is only 30 years old. It is part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which was formed and developed over a long period of time, by which the European Union tried to respond to the current security challenges.

The mentioned policy progressed with measured steps, probably characteristic of the European Union. The mentioned pace of dynamics was more or less understandable for the European Union in the light of current and at the same time not so alarming international developments, when the existing security and defense policy mechanisms more or less responded to the challenges in this regard. However, despite this, the greater visibility of the EU as a global security player in world politics and the development of relevant mechanisms was heard time and time again in the speeches of both experts and leaders of member states or high officials of the European Union.

It should be noted that Russia's military aggression in Ukraine highlighted the question of reviewing European security, including Europe's strategic autonomy. It can be said that the Russia-Ukraine war has played a stimulating role for the European Union to reassess its responsibility and role in the light of the

current severe crisis of European security, to take more effective care in establishing a long-term vision in terms of security and to develop updated mechanisms to implement this vision.

Taking this point of view into account, in the background of ongoing military operations in Europe, when the function of third states has increased, the issue of cooperation of European Union with third countries in the area of common security and defense policy, acquires special importance for European security. This issue acquired a completely different scale in the context of military political assistance to Ukraine.

The framework and mechanisms for the involvement of third countries in the Security and Defense Policy of the European Union

Several articles of the Treaty on the European Union deal with the issue of cooperation within the security and defense policy of the European Union. According to Article 21, "The Union shall seek to develop relations and build partnerships with third countries, and international, regional or global organisations which share the principles referred to in the first subparagraph. It shall promote multilateral solutions to common problems, in particular in the framework of the United Nations" (eur-lex.europa.eu, n.d.).

Articles 42-46 of the Treaty on the European Union create a particularly important legal basis, which completely deals with the common security and defense policy, its principles, implementation mechanisms and decision-making procedures.

It is worth noting that the challenges faced by the European Union were evolving, and with the 2016 Global Strategy, the European Union further expanded the scope of its security and defense policy, reformed its structure (Flott, 2020), where several strategic priorities were outlined, including the response to external conflicts and crises, cooperation with partners, building capacity and protecting the EU and its citizens. The global strategy emphasized the close connection between the EU's internal and external security, noted that the organization will strengthen its efforts to ensure collective European security and work closely with its partners. This is particularly significant in the context that "the EU cannot deny the opportunities of third states, an institutionalized network of reliable partnership strengthens the EU's reach and its reputation as a true global player" (Jan Joel Anderson, 2016).

This strategy was followed by the initiation of the "Strategic Compass" in 2020 and its adoption on March 22, 2022. The ongoing Russia-Ukraine war certainly added additional weight to the document, which in itself is a guide for the European Union to effective crisis management and capacity building until 2030. The document shows that the EU aims to respond appropriately to new challenges and is not just an echo of the Russia-Ukraine war (Moyer, 2022). "Strategic Compass" actually for the first time, within the framework of the current policy, clearly defines the measures of the future defense and security policy of the European Union. This document clearly expresses the ambitions of the European Union to gain more autonomy in terms of ensuring European security. However, it is also significant that the EU, with increased capacity, should become a more valuable partner of the North Atlantic Alliance. As the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Affairs, Joseph Borrell, says: "The war against Ukraine makes even more clear numerous changes to be carried out in the security and defense policy of the Eurozone. We have known this for years, but we have not always taken appropriate steps" (Council of the European Union, 2022;).

In general, the strategic compass is based on four main pillars: action, investment, partnership and security. At the same time, out of the mentioned four directions, the interest towards third countries is

directly reflected. This is especially clear in the context of the fourth pillar - partnership, which envisages the development of a tailored partnership, including with the Eastern Neighborhood. The mentioned perspective creates a wonderful opportunity for Georgia, among others, in terms of developing a common security and defense policy with the European Union. The strategic interest of the European Union in terms of further deepening of relations with Eastern Partnership countries and their inclusion in the European security system is also clearly visible.

Another important innovation in the implementation of the security and defense policy, but this time a financial mechanism, we should consider to be the European Peace Instrument (EPF), on which the European Union made a decision on March 21, 2022 (Council decision 2021). This instrument is a non-budgetary mechanism for financing the security and defense policy of the European Union, the purpose of which is to prevent conflicts, build peace and strengthen international security. This instrument replaced the previously existing Athens and African peace mechanisms. This mechanism is financed by the member states taking into account their gross national income (GNI). For the years 2021-2027, the mentioned mechanism provides a ceiling in the amount of 5.692 billion euros. (Council Decision 2021)

The main mechanisms of the involvement of third countries in the Security and Defense Policy of the European Union

Naturally, the involvement of third countries in the foreign and security policy of the European Union is supported by appropriate mechanisms, which already ensure that specific steps are taken at the operational and capacity level. It should be noted that for more than twenty years, within the framework of the mentioned policy, there has been a variety of relevant implementation mechanisms, which was accelerated by the growth of challenges and threats and the process of adequately reassessing the international relations situation on the part of the European Union.

Among the mentioned mechanisms, in the context of third countries, we should highlight the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). In 2020, the Council of the European Union defined the conditions under which a third country will be able to join the mentioned mechanism (Council Decision 2020). At this stage, according to the decision of the Council of the European Union on May 6, 2021, only the USA, Norway and Canada are invited from the third states to the mechanism of permanent structured cooperation. In addition, the Council of the European Union acknowledged Ukraine's desire to participate in projects within the framework of the aforementioned cooperation, although the decision on new projects will be made in May 2023, and Ukraine may also participate in any project under this mechanism with other EU countries from this period.

The European Defense Agency (EDA) is a significant mechanism for the involvement of third countries in the common security and defense policy of the European Union. Today, the agency has signed 4 cooperation agreements with non-EU countries, including on December 7, 2015 with Ukraine (as well as Norway, Switzerland, Serbia), which defines the principles of relations between the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine and the agency, on the issues of bilateral consultations the agency's work, security, as well as of revision of the agreement and the treaty validity (www.eda.europa.eu, 2015).

The European Defense Fund (EDF) supports the development and research of EU defense capabilities. According to Regulation 2021/697 on the European Defense Fund, together with the EU Member States, access to the Fund's grants is enjoyed by an associated third country, or a legal entity of the said country, which is not controlled by a non-associated third country or a legal entity of a non-associated third country. In this direction, the European Union has allocated a rather large sum of 8 billion euros for the

years 2021-2027, of which 2.65 billion euros are directed to research and innovation, and 5.3 billion to the development of defense capabilities. In 2021, the grants funded by 61 defense industry cooperation projects in the amount of 1.2 billion euros do not cover Ukraine, or any other third country (European Commission, 2021).

Within the framework of the security and defense policy, the EU military and civilian missions (CSDP missions) are an effective and efficient mechanisms for the implementation of the common security and defense policy as well as the EU global strategy. It is noteworthy that currently in Africa, Eastern Europe, the Western Balkans, and the Middle East, the European Union is implementing 19 different civil and military missions, in which about 4,000 people are involved (EEAS, Missions and operations 2021). A framework agreement for participation in missions was signed in 2005 between the European Union and Ukraine (<https://eur-lex.europa.eu/>, 2005). Within the mechanism of EU military and civilian missions, the EU is represented in Ukraine by the EUAM Ukraine and EUMAM, and Ukraine has actively participated in several EU missions, including the EU Naval Forces in Somalia, Operation EUNAVFOR Atalanta (<https://eunavfor.eu/mission>), Balkan Battlegroup (Turner, 2011).

EU support for Ukraine within the framework of Security and Defense Policy after the start of the Russia-Ukraine War

As a result of Russia's full-scale military intervention in Ukraine in February 2022, the EU completely changed its approaches and cautious attitude towards assistance in the military component of Ukraine. Russia's next, this time, full-scale military aggression against Ukraine clearly turned out to be the Rubicon, which clearly showed the European Union that the still remaining hope for dialogue with Russia was only naivety and a motivating factor for Moscow's military and political ambitions.

The largest military operations on the European continent since the Second World War forced the European Union to see the reality and use its available capabilities to the maximum in support of Ukraine. In addition to the support at the level of political statements, in which the EU has been really generous, the organization's financial and military support for Ukraine, unexpected for many, has increased significantly. In this regard, it is necessary to take into account the detail that in the security and defense policy, which is a part of the common foreign and security policy, decisions are made unanimously. For years, the mentioned form made it difficult for the EU to take more ambitious and effective steps in this direction. Against this background, the financial and military support of the EU seems not that impressive compared to the US (January 2022 - January 2023: US - up to 45 billion USD / EU (excluding individual military aid of member states) - 3.1 billion Euro) (European Council, 2022), However, at the same time, the problem of the volume of munitions production and the number of assembled military equipment was revealed, which is a clear result of the low military budget of European countries and less attention to defense over the years.

As we mentioned, the Russia-Ukraine war proved to be more ambitious in the context of the security and defense policy and, what is significant, a stimulus to provide effective assistance to Ukraine, even with the active involvement of those states that until the last moment were cautious about crossing the red lines in relations with Russia.

1. EU financial support to Ukraine for military purposes

As we mentioned, the financial support provided by the European Union to Ukraine for military purposes looks modest compared to the USA, although as we mentioned above, this has its own objective reasons. First of all, it should be noted that the security and defense policy of the European Union is not

included in the format of decisions on international issues, and therefore, within the framework of this policy, the consent of all member states, or at least the absence of a veto, is required. That is why the states are trying to make a compromise decision, where the multilateral interests and financial capabilities of the states will be taken into account. In addition, the historical dynamics of security and defense policy development in general and the approaches of states formed over the years, as well as the attitude towards the development of this policy have significant effects on the scope of the decision.

Considering the above, it is not surprising that before the Russia-Ukraine war, the security and defense policy mechanisms of the EU, as well as the spending and investments of the member states in the area of defense, were not fully sufficient to deal with the challenges, which became even more obvious as a result of the large-scale military aggression of Russia in Ukraine in 2022 (From 1999 to 2021, the combined defense spending of European countries increased by 19.7%, while during the same period, the combined defense spending of the US increased by 65.7%, Russia by 292%, and China by 592%) (European Commission, 2022).

In the context of a measured common security and defense policy, we should consider the fact that before the Russian military intervention, the European Union only modestly helped Ukraine through the Civilian Security Sector Reform Mission (EUAM), and at the end of 2021, in December, the European Union announced the European Peace Facility (EPF) to strengthen Ukraine's military capabilities - 31 million euros should have been allocated over 3 years. The mentioned amount should have been directed to strengthening the capabilities of military medics (Council of the EU, 2021).

Against the background of the EU's overly measured policy towards the Eastern Partnership countries, only after Russia's military aggression, the EU managed to quickly make several decisions on the issue of providing financial assistance to Ukraine with significantly increased military goals. At the same time, it should be noted that the allocated aid for the purchase of lethal weapons was the first time that the European Union decided to supply this type of weapons to a non-EU country. As EU High Representative Joseph Borrelli noted, "Another taboo has been removed. Taboo according to which the EU does not supply weapons in times of war. Yes we do.... Because this war requires our involvement to support the Ukrainian army" (Borrell, 2022).

Against the background of this support, quite logically, shortly after the start of Russia's large-scale aggression against Ukraine, on February 28, 2022, the EU foreign ministers made the first decision to provide 500 million euros of aid to Ukraine under the European Peace Facility (EPF). The Council of the European Union received a total of 6 packages of such assistance in the amount of 3.1 billion euros, which meant increasing the resilience of the Ukrainian army and protecting the civilian population, as well as providing the army with personal protective equipment, first aid kits, oil, military equipment and platforms (Council of the EU, 2022).

2. Direct military assistance

It should be noted that before the Russia-Ukraine war, the European Union did not provide direct military support to Ukraine. The maximum step that the European Union has taken in terms of supporting the topic of security in Ukraine was the European Union mission to support civil security sector reforms in Ukraine (EUAM) launched in 2014. The mentioned mission for Ukraine considered only the issues of security sector reform, including the issues of police and rule of law (Council decision, 2014). This fact, despite Russia's aggression in Crimea, shows the cautious attitude of the European Union towards clear military support for Ukraine.

At the same time, the situation has significantly changed after Russia's next full-scale military aggression against Ukraine. The military support of a financial nature, which the European Union provided and provides to the armed forces of Ukraine, could not fully meet the needs of Ukraine, taking into account the fact that Ukraine is actually fighting (at least on paper) the second army in the world. As a result, against the background of various types of support, the idea of providing direct military aid to Ukraine matured in the European Union. This possibility was formally discussed on August 30, 2022 at the informal meeting of EU defense ministers in Prague (Czech Presidency of the Council, 2022). This was also caused by the fact that individual EU members provided military aid to Ukraine in a bilateral format (including, according to January data: Germany and Poland 2.4 billion euros, the Netherlands 860 million euros, France and Italy 700 million euros, the Czech Republic 460 and Sweden 550 million euros). In total, the EU countries have provided Ukraine with 8.61 billion euros of aid both in terms of the supply of military products and the allocation of financial support for military purposes (economy, 2022).

Based on this situation and in order to provide more effective military assistance to Ukraine, on October 17, 2022, the Council of the European Union finally agreed on the issue of launching the Military Assistance Mission for Ukraine (EUMAM) (COUNCIL DECISION 2022). However, it is worth noting that the decision was slightly delayed due to differences of opinion among the member states on the issue of the leadership structure of the mission. It is also interesting that Hungary refrained from participating in the final decision of the Council, which is an opportunity given by the first paragraph of Article 31 of the Treaty on the European Union in terms of making a unanimous decision on the issue of common foreign and security policy. Hungary has used the possibility that a state can abstain from participating in the vote, but not block the decision, which also allows it not to participate in the implementation of the decision.

The military assistance mission will be headed by French Vice Admiral Hervé Bléjean, who is also the Director General of the EU Military Committee and has extensive experience in leading missions and working in NATO. The leadership of the mission will be based in Brussels. It should be noted that the mission will have 4 main tasks: individual and collective training of the Armed Forces of Ukraine at basic, enhanced and specialized levels; specialized training; training of the Territorial Defense Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine; Coordination of exercises related to Ukraine by EU member states (COUNCIL DECISION (2022).

It is assumed that within the framework of this mission, up to 15,000 soldiers will be trained within 2 years, of which 12,000 will undergo basic training, and 2,800 soldiers will undergo specialized training; considering the ongoing hostilities, the mission will not operate on the territory of Ukraine and will be conducted mainly on the territory of Poland and Germany (Nováky, 2022). The trainings will be provided in the following areas: medical, logistical, mining and basic combat engineering issues; training of combined arms instructors for territorial defense forces; cyber security and cyber defense; chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear defense; equipment maintenance and repair issues. The mandate of the mission was defined for a period of 2 years with a budget of 106,700,000 euros, which will be financed from the European Instrument for Peace (consilium.europa.eu, 2022). Commander of the Polish Armed Force's 11th Armored Cavalry Division, with the combat experience in Afghanistan and Iraq, Piotr Trytek has been appointed to lead a mission in Poland, which plays a crucial role in training of Ukrainian troops (Charlish, 2022). It should be noted that 1,100 Ukrainian soldiers were trained as part of the mission at the beginning of December (eas.europa.eu, 2022).

Despite the fact that the scale of military aid of the European Union is unprecedented for a third country, it is desirable to consider its comparison with the needs of Ukraine. From this point of view, the

December 3 interview of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, General Zaluzhny, is really interesting. In an interview, Zaluzhny talks about the necessary armament that Ukraine needs to win the war, which includes up to 300 tanks, up to 500 howitzers, and up to 600-700 armored vehicles (An interview with General Valery Zaluzhny, head of Ukraine's armed forces, 2022). A comparison of the mentioned request and the assistance of the European Union at this stage shows that the European Union will need to do more in the process of bilateral military assistance by the USA and European countries. At the same time, satisfying the need for military assistance to Ukraine gives grounds for cautious optimism on the part of many international specialists. As well as other actors, the EU needs to provide proportional military support to Ukraine (Paul, 2022), (Tocci, 2022).

Although the military aid allocated by the European Union to Ukraine does not look impressive compared to the support provided by the USA, at the same time, the European Union decided for the first time in its history to supply lethal weapons to a third country. Moreover, if we compare the scale of the EU military mission in Ukraine with the operational area as well as the scale of other military training missions that are carried out outside the EU (amount of personnel to be trained, variety of mission objectives), the difference is really noticeable (Mali, EEAS, EUTM Mali, 2021, Mozambique EEAS, EUTM Mozambique, 2021, Central African Republic EEAS, EUTM RCA, 2021, Somalia, EEAS, EUTM Somalia, 2021).

In general, it should be noted that the European Union has some experience of institutional cooperation with Ukraine within the framework of security and defense policy, including, as mentioned, the Civilian Security Sector Reform Mission (EUAM), the agreement between Ukraine and the EU on involvement in EU crisis management operations, as well as the administrative agreement with the European Defense Agency. Considering the factor. We should also not forget Ukraine's involvement in several EU military missions.

On the other hand, the European Union has quite a good international experience of training missions mainly in the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa and the Sahel region, including Mozambique, Mali, Central African Republic and Somalia, where the task of the missions was to train the institutions of the defense system and the armed forces of the mentioned countries.

There are several important innovations and steps forward that the format of the military assistance mission has created in support of Ukraine. First - according to the first paragraph of Article 42 of the Treaty on the European Union, the European Union may resort to operational actions based on civil and military means when carrying out missions outside the European Union. Despite the fact that there is an EU mission ongoing in the territorial waters of the European Union (in the territorial waters of Greece, Malta, Italy) - in the form of Mission Sophia and subsequent operation med Irini (EUnavforIrini, 2025), as well as a military mission on land directly in the European Union, is carried out in Poland and Germany, the mentioned one is the first precedent of its kind. In addition - although the EU has experience in providing military training for the military or security forces of African countries fighting terrorists, for example, Mali (EEAS, EUTM Mali, 2021), Mozambique (EEAS, EUTM Mozambique, 2021), the Central African Republic (EEAS, EUTM RCA, 2021), for Somalia (EEAS, EUTM Somalia, 2021), so far it has not provided assistance to a country directly involved in full-scale hostilities. In addition to the above, the military assistance provided and planned to Ukraine is much larger than the assistance provided to third countries.

Finally, taking into account the above, it is possible to highlight some noteworthy points. First of all, in contrast to other policies of the European Union, which have a long history of development, the security

and defense policy of the European Union is thirty-two years old, which is not a very long period considering the development of the organization and the peculiarities of this policy. Accordingly, taking into account the steps taken in this regard by the European Union, especially in the last few months, including the adoption of a security strategy (strategic compass), direct delivery of lethal weapons to third countries, direct military assistance, etc., it seems that it is well aware of the importance of its place in the architecture of international security. It is the echo of the mentioned that the security and defense policy is being adapted at a fast pace to the new security environment and new challenges. This is also evidenced by the opinions expressed at the highest level regarding more flexible decision-making by the European Union within the framework of the aforementioned policy (ec.europa.eu, 2017), (elysee.fr, 2018), (HERSZENHORN, 2022).

It is no less significant that the increased dynamics of EU support to Ukraine also reflects the understanding of the fact that the tendency of European countries to reduce military spending over the years, the existing disproportion between the military mechanisms component of the national security issue and the economic welfare policy has finally turned out to be counterproductive. Today, the European Union and its member states have to pay significant financial costs, the total amount of aid (financial, humanitarian, military) provided to Ukraine by the institutions of the European Union and the member states is already more than 50 billion euros (kiel institute for world economy, 2023). In addition, naturally, the volume of the impact of the war on the economy of the EU member states, and the financial burden for Ukraine's post-war recovery will be huge.

It is worth noting that predicting the end of the Russia-Ukraine war is a difficult task considering both its military and political components. As we can see, the efficiency and volume of military assistance to Ukraine, according to the opinion of the Ukrainian military officials, is not adequate. Nevertheless, the European Union, together with other international players, will continue to provide this assistance. As today completely new circumstances dictate the pace and modalities of military aid to the EU, it is also possible that security and defense policy mechanisms for relations with third countries will be revised and become much more flexible. This new situation creates qualitatively new precedents in terms of increasing the effectiveness of the above-mentioned EU policy in relation to third countries. It is this important and essentially new image that should contribute to the irreversibility of the process of positioning the EU as a weighty, bold, active player in international politics.

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